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Introduction  
January 30, 2005 the people of Iraq participated in their first open election in fifty years. They 
voted amid confusion, persistent and escalating violence, and a boycott by key players. American 
anticipation of Iraq’s vote was intense; American expectations for it, muted. Mixed messages 
abounded. The U.S. Department of Defense Defend America news website hit a pre-election 
optimistic high note: “Iraqi Troops Risk Lives for Elections;” and “Iraqi Democracy Will Be Defined 
by Iraqis.” Meanwhile, mainstream media reported Sunni Arabs were boycotting the vote, Iraqi 
security forces had deserting some stations, and violence in general was escalating in advance of 
the elections. Expectation management was in order, and the Bush Administration provided it. 
The elections, a senior official conceded, would be “messy at best.”[1]  
Nuances of Success  
The conduct of the election exceeded expectations. All understood that Shiite and Kurdish voters 
were eager to vote, but how to make it safe for them to do so? Shutting down vehicle traffic, as it 
turned out, made a world of difference. An extraordinary 260 attacks were sustained Sunday, in a 
nation habituated to a daily average of 60.[2] Nine people blew themselves up, and yet an 
estimated sixty percent of Iraqi voters made it to the polls. Because the level (or effect) of the 
violence was much lower than expected, the U.S. dollar rallied on world markets.[3] The 
participation rate was quickly compared favorably to American elections, was little mention that 
this figure appears to have included few Sunnis.[4] President George Bush promptly claimed 
victory, pronouncing the problematic outcome a “resounding success.”  
In this Strategic Insight, I emphasize that the outcome of Sunday’s vote is by definition 
temporary—Iraq’s third temporary government since the occupation.[5] Although the elections 
signify a significant step toward self-governance, it is self-governance without a monopoly on the 
use of force. Authoritarian rulers in the region, no longer worried that a democracy domino will 
endanger them, are more concerned about the stability of the power equilibrium created by the 
election. Despite efforts to promote an inclusive, consensual democracy, the name of the game is 
identity politics.  
The electoral formula plus boycott add up to disproportionate under-representation for Arab 
Sunnis—a diverse and problematic group. Iraq’s Shiites (roughly 60% of the population) will now 
translate demographic weight into government power. The Kurds (at about 20% of the population) 
united their lists and initiated a referendum on secession in a side vote. The Arab Sunni 
population (also about 20%)—the minority that dominated under Saddam Hussein—had the most 
to lose in a democratic contest, and they sought to spoil it. Iraq’s Arab Sunnis opted out 
participation in the rule-making process for the new Iraq, and perhaps, out a unified Iraq. Unless 
side negotiations bring the Sunnis back in, the next phase of Iraq’s post-conflict transition will 
shake regional power balances and narrow American options in Iraq.  
The Ballot  
In a survey taken just one month prior to the election, as many as 41% of Iraqis asked “what will 
Iraqis be voting for on January 30?” indicated—incorrectly—that they’d be voting for a president. 
The correct answer, that the main election is for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), was 
chosen by fewer than 29%.[6] The 275-member body will perform two important roles:  
1. The TNA will choose a 3-member Presidency Council that will in turn select a Prime 
Minister;  
2. The TNA will draft a permanent constitution for Iraq; that is, the TNA will make the rules 
for the new Iraq.  
More days at the polls are to come. The Assembly should finish drafting the constitution by 
August 15. There will be another big day at the polls when the draft is put up for a popular 
referendum in October. According to this schedule, a third vote will take place for the new 
government about December 15, 2005, so that a permanent government of Iraq will be seated on 
December 31. If two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces reject the constitution, it will go 
back to the drawing board for another attempt in October 2006. This provision is controversial, 
because it gives the Kurds (who control three provinces) an effective veto.  
Each province also voted for members of a Governorate Council. Most of these will have 41 seats, 
except Baghdad with 51. In the Kurdish provinces, there will be a third item on the ballot, seats for 
a 111-member Kurdistan National Assembly.[7] The provisional rules known as the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) recognizes Kurdistan Regional Government within a unified Iraq, and 
presents the option for any three provinces to form such a body.  
Election Mechanics  
The event was largely an Iraqi show performed by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. 
The International Mission for Iraqi Elections based in Amman Jordan provided a small number of 
monitors. A small United Nations presence assisted the elections.  
Some 14.5 million Iraqi citizen aged 18 and older were eligible to vote within Iraq at 5,500 polling 
stations. Registration began November 1 and in theory ended December 15, but election-day 
registration was possible in some places. The process was easier in some respects than in a 
typical post-conflict registration drive, because extraordinary measures were unnecessary. The 
voting rosters were put together using the Oil for Food rationing lists. When a citizen appeared for 
their rations, this person was given a paper that showed the registration information for that family. 
If there were any inaccuracies, the citizen would bring the corrected paper on the following visit.[8] 
An additional 1-2 million Iraqis were eligible to vote out of country, facilitated by the International 
Organization for Migration.  
Security was the most serious concern given recent increase of rebel activity in the run-up to the 
election.[9] U.S. military forces did a “plus up—increased their number from 135,000 to 150,000 
for the election. However, they and their estimated 23,000 multinational military partners stood 
back, and provided over-the-horizon backup only to Iraqi security forces during the election. Iraqi 
forces, generously estimated to number 127,000, were far short of the 270,000 some believe are 
needed to secure the election.[10] Observers were responsible for their own transportation and 
safety.[11] The government declared a state of emergency, including curfews and restricted 
movement between provinces and into and out of Iraq. The location of some polling places was 
kept secret until the last minute, confounding the uncertainty for Iraqis. The number of polling 
stations steadily declined in the days before the election. It was initially estimated to be 28,000, 
dropped for several weeks in December to 9,000, until it settled at the 5,500 mark.[12] Long lines 
were a dangerous possibility.  
The electoral commission believed an election untainted by fraud was more important than the 
turnout, although most Iraqis surveyed were more concerned about security than about the 
procedural integrity of the polls.[13] A plan for inking the thumb of voters, as was done in 
Afghanistan’s recent election, provided a visual for the President’s State of the Union address. 
The commission used permanent ink, but decided against using invisible ink. This must have 
discouraged some voters, those who received death threats if they participated in the elections. 
On the other hand, it might have encouraged voters in Shiite and Kurdish areas who were 
strongly encouraged to vote.  
The Show Must Go On  
There are alternative views on the value of elections after war. The United Nations Peacekeeping 
Handbook sees elections as vital to create venues for non-violent contests. Another view is that 
elections are the means by which the United States legitimates the use of force to domestic and 
international audiences.[14] The first view requires the process to be “widely accepted by the 
participating population as legitimate and binding” in order to be effective.[15] The second view 
does not.  
Two years seems to be the “magic number” for preparation of elections among those promoting 
democracy as the best long-term guarantor of peace.[16] However, the conditions in Iraq twenty-
two months after intervention clearly did not meet the UN criteria for wide acceptance. Prominent 
Iraqis of many stripes called for delay in November, but the schedule was firm. One might cite the 
occupation authority’s proxy constitution for Iraq, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of 
March 2004, that set a deadline of Jan. 31; or the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1546 that quotes the TAL. More importantly, the Bush Administration and Shiite forces in Iraq 
refuse to allow delay.  
The Bush Administration could not afford to delay the elections. Columnist Thomas Friedman 
argued against delay because it would stem the insurgency. Insurgents who are today fighting 
external occupiers and their collaborators today will, after the elections, no longer be able to call 
themselves liberators. The third transitional government in Iraq is also the second “sovereign 
Iraqi” government, but the first citizen-chosen government. After the vote, the insurgent’s true 
aim—to reassert tyranny—will be obvious. “The civil war we want,” says columnist Thomas 
Friedman, “is a democratically elected Iraqi government against the Baathist and Islamist 
militants.”[17] Friedman’s argument is dubious. First, as long as one hundred thousand plus 
external troops remain in Iraq, we can expect militants to make liberation claims. Second, 
America does not want civil war in Iraq of any sort. The commander of Multi-National Corps—Iraq, 
Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz wanted the voting to go forward, in order to avoid a civil war. “There is a 
greater chance of civil war with a delay,” said Metz, because the insurgents would use a delay to 
sabotage democratic processes further.[18] What Metz left unspoken is the risk of delay for U.S. 
relations with Shiite elements.  
Some Shiites made veiled threats of violence if elections were postponed. For example, Ayatollah 
Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi warned that “the areas which are safe at present, will burn with fire 
if the elections are postponed.”[ 19] Influential Shiite leaders have already been put off.[20] 
Moreover, there is the matter of U.S. debt to Shiite leaders for months of reprieve with their 
forces.[21] It was not always so. In August 2004, American and Iraqi forces fought the Mahdi 
Army supporters of renegade Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr for several weeks at the shrine of the 
Imam Ali in Najaf. This was a bloody encounter with hundreds of casualties and a holy site in the 
middle. It was concluded after Ayatollah Sistani brokered a deal with Sadr that ended the battle 
and gave Sadr an opening to participate in Iraqi politics.[22] This peace has provided the military 
more freedom to concentrate on Sunni insurgents in Falluja, and total occupation of the city in the 
fall of 2004.  
The facts on the ground matter to the politics in the voting booth. U.S. military forces conducted 
major sweeps of Sunni areas, but these clearly were not voter registration drives. Four of Iraq’s 
eighteen provinces—parts of Baghdad, Anber (including Falluja and Ramadi), Ninevah (including 
Mosul) and Salahadin (home to Saddam Husssein’s hometown, Tikrit) are acknowledged to be 
“unsafe” for elections.[23] In December, the entire electoral commission in Mosul reportedly quit 
after they were threatened, voter registration papers were burned, the security forces were 
chased out of town, militants’ posters warned those participating in the elections would be 
beheaded, and the population was oblivious to the coming election. Dionne Searcey reported 
from Mosul just weeks before the election that confusion was universal:  
Iraqis from the worst and best of neighborhoods say they don't understand whether they're 
registered or what they're being asked to vote on. Many plan to stay home out of fear. A 
pharmacist on the west side of town, asked recently about the elections, seemed confident: "Yes, 
yes, I know. They are happening in other provinces, not in Mosul."[24]  
A Democratic Vision  
The Transitional Administrative Law of 2004 for now operates as the rules for Iraq. It is supposed 
to do so until a permanent government is seated in December, but this may be optimistic. Article 
4 articulates a vision for the new Iraq:  
The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and 
powers shall be shared…  
…based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon 
origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.[25]  
The republican vision is the least problematic. It means simply that the head of state is not a 
monarch, leaders serve a limited term, and successors are chosen by electoral process. 
Federalism here specifically refers to power shared “between the federal government and the 
regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations.” Federalism 
generally means a guaranteed division of power, but also works best with other elements that are 
lacking in Iraq: strong bicameralism in the legislature (a strong Senate to match a strong 
Congress), a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review.[26] Despite the TAL’s expressed 
intention to proscribe power sharing based upon identity, that is precisely the direction Iraq is 
headed.  
Democracy, as articulated in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, means “the will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government.”[27] The radical Sunni Isamist group 
Ansar al-Sunnah does not agree this is universal. Late December they posted a notice that “rule 
of the people…denies the belief in one God.”[28] They warned that un-Islamic laws could be the 
product of democracy. As if taking a page from the political playbook of U.S. Republicans in 2004, 
they warn that their opponents could be leading the people on a path to religiously unacceptable 
laws, including laws permitting homosexual marriage.  
As in many new democracies with non-homogenous populations, the most vexing challenge is to 
accommodate pluralism, to create a framework that respects differences in political interaction. In 
societies divided by ethnic and religious cleavages, as in Iraq, how can divergent groups coexist 
without conflict on the one hand or assimilation on the other? Diffused power and decision-
making, so that more people affected by decisions participate in them, are common approaches 
to encourage people to develop more commitment to society at large.  
The federalist vision and the electoral formula designed for Iraq were largely consistent with an 
approach that seeks to accommodate differences. Arend Lijphart would call this a consensus as 
opposed to a marjoritarian approach to governance.[29] Lijphart provides a useful distinction 
among democracies according to how they answer the simple question, “who should govern?” 
Some answer “the majority of the people;” others reply, “as many people as possible.” The first 
general type, majoritarian government, concentrates power in the hands of a bare majority—
possibly only a plurality. It relies upon good losers who will return to fight another day. Consensus 
government seeks to maximize majorities by creating a framework for broad participation and 
agreement.  
Electoral formula in majoritarian democracies commonly give the election to the candidate with 
the most votes—this may or may not be the same as a majority (over 50 percent), according to 
the plurality rule. This formula tends to produce gaps in representation, rewarding those with the 
plurality with a disproportionate number of seats. Proportional representation (PR), as an 
electoral formula aims to represent both majorities and minorities. This was the formula used in 
Iraq’s January 30 election.  
In a PR system, parties nominate lists of candidates and voters cast their ballot for one list or 
another. Seats are then allocated in proportion to the votes collected. A list including 275 names 
that receives twenty percent of the vote would send the top fifty-five names on its list to fill seats 
in the Assembly. In order to promote better gender representation, every third candidate on each 
list submitted for the Iraqi election must be a woman. Proportional Representation requires 
multimember districts, so that several voices can be selected from a given constituency (the size 
of the district is the district magnitude). In Iraq, the district magnitude is the maximum—the entire 
nation plus out of country voters. This magnitude might be consistent with the vision of a federal 
Iraq if parties and coalitions in Iraq were well-organized federally, but they are not.  
There are some obvious advantages to a PR system with maximum district magnitude in the Iraqi 
TNA election. As noted, PR is more inclusive and indeed, representative. It encourages alliances. 
It is also less expensive, more secure because no one has to campaign where it is most 
dangerous, and most easily accommodates out-of-country voting. On the other hand, this formula 
favors parties and despite the existence of some long-standing parties, party development in Iraq 
is in its infancy. Because it is easier to fund a party list than to buy off voters in each district, 
Michael Rubin argues, this formula favors external influence.[30] The district magnitude means 
that representatives will not be beholden, and thereby responsible to, particular communities of 
people. The bottom line is that making the entire nation the district avoided the problem of having 
to appoint representatives of Mosul and Falluja if voting is impossible in those cities.  
It appears unlikely that insecurity lead Iraqi voters to endorse the U.S. Administration’s supposed 
choice, current Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, running on a slate called the Iraqi List. This slate is 
ethnically and religiously diverse, and is most importantly is fronted by a perceived 
“strongman.”[31] The more likely outcome is dominance of the constitutional assembly by the 
religious Shiite slate United Iraqi Alliance. This is the slate sanctioned by the cleric Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani, although he is not directly participating in the election. The list is topped by Abd al-Aziz 
Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, associated with the Badr 
Corps.[32] Assembly dominance by the Sistani slate does not mean the imposition of clerical rule 
in Iraq, but will likely lead to a special relationship with Iran.  
Powers and Interests in the Iraqi Election  
Iran provided sanctuary to the Iraqi group that dominates that slate, the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and has anticipated its neighbor’s moment of democracy. The United 
States relationship with that country has been tense. General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. 
Central Command, rattled a nuclear saber in late November, 2004:  
Why the Iranians would want to move against us…is beyond me…If you ever even contemplate 
our nuclear capability, it should give everybody the clear understanding that there is no power 
that can match the United States militarily.[33]  
Post-election Iraq will also likely draw away from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, nations that are 
largely Sunni. Jordanian King Abdullah caused a stir in December when he alleged that a large 
number of Iranians crossed into Iraq before the election. He raised the specter of a “Shiite 
crescent” from Iraq through Iran to Azerbaijan that might even include Syria and Lebanon. This 
would destabilize nations with large Shiite populations: “Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from 
this,” he said. “It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shiite-
Sunni conflict even more, as you're taking it out of the borders of Iraq.”[34]  
The Kurdish parties have created a united list in order to improve their position in relation to 
others. They seek autonomy but will negotiate with the Shiite groups about their mutual concern 
regarding the Arab Sunnis. Neighboring Turkey and Iran also are home to large Kurdish 
populations, and encourage Iraq’s Kurds to participate in the constitutional process within Iraq.  
Along with Syria, Turkey and Iran possess the heavy land armies that are conceivably capable of 
occupation of Iraqi terrain if the U.S. military pulls out and Iraq breaks apart. Syria is about 
seventy-four percent Sunni, but that majority is ruled by minority Allawites, an offshoot of Shiism. 
Syria therefore has its own concerns about spillover effects of radicalized Sunni populations.  
U.S. President George W. Bush has called the elections a “historical marker for our Iraq 
policy.”[35] Some, including the current Iraqi Interim Government’s Prime Minister Allawi, see this 
marker as a possible marker for American troop withdrawal.[36] Bush Administration officials 
have been very clear that after the so-called transfer of sovereignty June 28, U.S. troops would 
leave if requested. If the country breaks apart, there will be more than one entity with whom the 
United States would have to negotiate the matter.  
The best hope for Iraq, and the region, may be in the discussions among Iraqi Shiite and Sunni 
leaders that continue despite the Sunni boycott. The idea of “playing with the end result” of the 
elections by appointing Sunnis to the TNA is hardly appealing. However, for Iraq to remain viable 
as a nation, disaffected Iraqis must have non-violent mechanisms to express their interest. Iraq 
has pulled off the election, however imperfect. The drafting of the constitution engage those 
elements before putting it forward for ratification in another messy and possibly violent vote.  
Conclusion  
The elections are an important step in Iraq’s externally-forced transition from authoritarian rule 
and its post-conflict transition to self-governance. Because the Transitional National Assembly will 
be chosen by Iraqis, it is an improvement on its two predecessors as a step toward a permanent 
government in Iraq, something America hopes to see. Despite the best intentions of the election’s 
designers for an inclusive, consensual democracy in Iraq, the TNA will most likely be chosen by 
an incomplete number of Iraqis. This election may therefore lead Iraq away from the vision of 
Iraqi government—pluralistic, unified, and at peace with its neighbors—America hopes to see. 
Iraq’s Sunnis, in opting out of the constitutional process, are opting out of a project for a unified 
Iraq. The best hope for achieving peace is in the willingness of those who do participate in the 
elections to find accommodation with them. The disenfranchisement of the increasingly 
radicalized Sunnis spells trouble for all of Iraq, the region and U.S. interests.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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